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Dark Law on the South China Sea
Stephen Cody*

Abstract
In Democracies and International Law, Tom Ginsburg warns of an emerging
post-liberal order influenced by powerful authoritarian regimes and new illiberal laws that
repurpose global rights, undermine international courts, and expand executive power. Autocrats
and kleptocrats embedded in the global economy increasingly appear to use international law to
preserve their power, protect norms of non-intervention, and enhance the global stability of
autocratic rule. Legalistic autocrats, for example, exploit judicial deference and vague statutory
language in national security laws to circumvent checks on their authority. This process, which I
call “dark law,” aids in the consolidation of state power and the global entrenchment of
authoritarianism. In this Essay, I argue that dark law also contributes to the construction of
authoritarian international law. Conflicts in the South China Sea illustrate how authoritarian
regimes use law to pursue illiberal ends. By disregarding multilateral treaty obligations, resisting
third-party adjudication, and repurposing national security laws, authoritarian states sabotage
maritime norms and principles. International dark law makes global waterways more dangerous
for sailors and fishing communities, undermines international cooperation on marine protection,
and threatens maritime accountability and ocean governance. Future protection of oceans and seas
depends on state compliance with international law and the effectiveness of multilateral
enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
These are perilous times for democracies and international law.1 Tom
Ginsburg warns of an emerging post-liberal order defined by powerful
authoritarian regimes that repurpose global rights, undermine international courts,
and expand executive power.2 Autocrats embedded in the global economy appear
increasingly willing to cooperate with each other and use international law to
counter democratic challenges to their power.
Legalistic autocrats regularly exploit judicial deference and vague statutory
language in national security laws to circumvent checks on their authority. 3 This
process, which I call “dark law,” aids in the consolidation of state power and the
global entrenchment of authoritarianism.4 But dark law also transforms norms and
principles of international law.
Conflicts in the South China Sea illustrate how authoritarian regimes
strategically repurpose national security laws to circumvent international legal
obligations. Most visibly, the People’s Republic of China (China) repeatedly
disregards treaty obligations, rejects third-party adjudication, and enacts domestic
laws in violation of its commitments under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While steadfastly defending norms of
non-intervention and principles of Westphalian sovereignty,5 President Xi Jinping
and the Chinese Communist Party continue to use law to shift international
benchmarks and avoid accountability on the South China Sea.
In this Essay, I argue that legal vagueness and a lack of meaningful judicial
review have given way to a rising tide of dark law in the contested waters of the
South China Sea. Although China argues for “historic rights” to exclusive control
of vast maritime territories, coastal neighbors strongly dispute those claims.6
Governing law under UNCLOS clarifies the requirements for establishing
territorial boundaries in oceans and seas and emphasizes adjudication and
arbitration as mechanisms to resolve maritime conflicts.7 However, China has

1
2
3

4
5

6

7

See TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2021).
See id. at 187.
See Stephen Cody, Dark Law: Legalistic Autocrats, Judicial Deference, and the Global Transformation of
National Security, 6 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 643, 647 (2020).
Id. at 650–53.
See Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and
Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 98, 105 (2013).
Bill Hayton, The Modern Creation of China’s ‘Historic Rights’ Claim in the South China Sea, 49 ASIAN AFFS.
370, 372 (2018); Zou Keyuan, Historic Rights in International Law and in China's Practice, 32 OCEAN
DEV. & INT’L L. 149, 163 (2001).
See Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Andrew P. Owsiak, Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow
of UNCLOS, 115 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 599 (2021).
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demonstrated a willingness to assert jurisdictional control and deploy military
power in defiance of UNCLOS principles and norms.8
Enter dark law, a relational approach to the study of national security
lawmaking and legality. Autocratic legalism and poorly defined security laws
exacerbate legal uncertainty beyond national jurisdictions. The exploitation of
domestic statutory language and judicial weakness reinforces the power of
autocrats to pursue illiberal ends and generally supports authoritarian forms of
international law. Dark law is not a category of law, but rather a web of
legislative-judicial-political relations that erode legal protections and empower
legalistic autocrats. The term describes contradictory processes by which autocrats
rely on statutory vagueness in national security laws to engage in state actions
counter to established international law. Dark law, therefore, aids and abets the
genesis of authoritarian international law. In recent years, China has enacted or
revised domestic maritime security laws to provide legal cover for acts of
aggression and illegality on the South China Sea.9 Dark law helps to focus analytic
attention on the relations between lawmaking, judicial review, and autocratic
politics. It provides insight into these maritime disputes and a porthole into the
recursive construction of authoritarian international law.10
Ocean governance depends on multilateral cooperation and enforcement.
But authoritarian penchants for domestic control, political stability, and
bilateralism often undermine maritime law and regulatory ocean compliance.11
International dark law thus threatens treaty compliance and oceanic
accountability. Under some circumstances, it can also erode customary law and
subvert international governance of the high seas. Below, I analyze two recent
maritime laws to show how Beijing employs dark law to skirt its international legal
obligation under UNCLOS. I conclude with modest proposals that would increase
ocean protection and resolve disputes in the South China Sea.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW FAILS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed ocean basin crucial to global trade
and rich in natural resources.12 Therefore, it has regional and global economic
8

See Jerome A. Cohen, Law and Power in China’s International Relations, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
123, 132–45 (2019).

9

11

See Diane A. Desierto, China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Activities in the South China Sea, 96 INT’L L.
STUD. 257, 268–73 (2020); Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey & Henry Holst, Surging Second Sea
Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond, 72
NAVAL WAR COLL. REVIEW 11, 11–12 (2019).
See generally Terence Halliday, Recursivity of Global Norm Making: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 263 (2009).
See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 267–69.

12

See CHOON-HO PARK, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 283–84 (1983).

10
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significance.13 Nearly one-third of all global commerce and about half of global
oil and gas shipments pass through the sea annually.14 About $3.4 trillion in
goods—including 14% of all U.S. trade, 40% of China’s, and 86% of Vietnam’s—
traverse the Sea’s waterways.15 The Sea also yields about 12% of the world’s fish
catch, providing crucial livelihoods and food security for coastal communities in
surrounding states.16 Dwindling fish stocks caused by overfishing and declining
biodiversity have worsened territorial disputes in recent years.17
Debates over seabed rights and opportunities for resource exploration have
also exacerbated regional tensions.18 The South China Sea has substantial reserves
of oil and gas. A 2010 U.S. Geological Survey estimated a mean of 21.6 billion
untapped barrels of oil and a mean of nearly 300 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
in 23 southeast Asian provinces around the Sea.19 Chinese surveys are even more
optimistic and estimate as much as 105 billion barrels of oil near the Spratly
Islands continental shelf alone.20 Scores of companies are jostling to exploit these
natural resources.21
Hundreds of small islands, reefs, and rocks are scattered throughout the
South China Sea. However, only a few dozen maritime features—including the
Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Islands—naturally stay above water
at high tide and, thus, support territorial claims.22 Seven countries make
overlapping claims to these islands and other territory in the South China Sea:
Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
Conflicts between these coastal states have dogged the region since the Geneva
Conventions established an international law of the sea in the 1960s.23 By the
1970s, UNCLOS negotiations had raised the stakes for coastal countries, who
risked losing access to undiscovered oil and natural gas reserves. Consequently,
13
14
15

16

17
18

See generally BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (2014).
See TOMMY KOH, BUILDING A NEW LEGAL ORDER FOR THE OCEANS 156 (2020).
How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?, CHINA POWER (Mar. 28, 2022),
https://perma.cc/796G-J3M9.
Jill I. Goldenziel, Law as a Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Global Escalation of Lawfare, 106 CORNELL
L. REV. 1085, 1102 (2021).
See Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Security Implications of Fisheries, 95 INT’L AFFS. 1019, 1020 (2019).
See generally MARK J. VALENCIA, JON M. VAN DYKE & NOEL A. LUDWIG, SHARING THE RESOURCES
OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (2021).

22

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 (2010).
ANDERS CORR, GREAT POWERS, GRAND STRATEGIES: THE NEW GAME IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
292 (2018).
See Katherine Morton, China's Ambition in the South China Sea: Is a Legitimate Maritime Order Possible?,
92 INT’L AFFS. 909, 915 (2016).
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

23

See Gao & Jia, supra note 5, at 105.
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21
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state political leaders began to insist on unilateral control over coastal waters,
maritime features, and exclusive resource rights.
China claims historic rights to about 80% of the South China Sea, including
all waters and maritime features enclosed by a nine-dash line, a U-shaped zone
stretching 1,200 miles south of the Chinese mainland. 24 The nine-dash line has
remained central to Beijing’s maritime claims and even become part of Chinese
national identity.25 Legal experts and neighboring states, however, regularly
criticize China’s nine-dash line as an overstated territorial claim and strongly
dispute China’s assertions based on principles set forth in UNCLOS.26
UNCLOS establishes a framework for maritime governance in oceans and
seas worldwide, including the contested waters of the South China Sea.27 The
European Union and 167 countries have signed and ratified the Convention,
which came into force in 1994 and replaces the 1958 “Convention on the High
Seas.” UNCLOS also created several bedrock maritime institutions, including the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Seabed
Authority (ISA), and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS).
China signed UNCLOS in 1982 and ratified the treaty in 1996.28 During the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), China
also voted to approve the treaty language regarding maritime territories.29 Under
UNCLOS, each state is entitled to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea and a 200
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where states have exclusive rights
to exploit natural resources.30
However, these territorial rights and offshore boundaries often depend on
the legal status of maritime features. An island, for example, can support the 12
nautical mile territorial sea and the 200 nautical mile EEZ for its country. But a
feature achieves the legal status of an “island” only if, in its natural condition, it

29

Hayton, supra note 13, at 55.
Zheng Wang, The Nine-Dashed Line: “Engraved in Our Hearts”, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 25, 2014),
https://perma.cc/38MK-SJY4.
See Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South
China Sea, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 142 (2013).
See UNCLOS, preamble at 4:
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans
which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their
resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection
and preservation of the marine environment.
UNCLOS: Declarations Made Upon Signature, Ratification, Accession, or Succession or Anytime
Thereafter, China, June 7, 1996, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, https://perma.cc/3M4P-NV48.
Beckman, supra note 26, at 154.

30

UNCLOS, supra note 22, at 43.
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can sustain either a stable long-term community of people or an economic activity
that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature. 31 This
legal status distinction matters a great deal because artificial islands or other
structures built on reefs do not satisfy the UNCLOS definition of an island or
establish territorial seas. It has also led to national claims and counterclaims
characterized by Tommy Koh, former President of UNCLOS III, as: “My rock is
an island, and your island is only a rock.”32
For decades, China has violated maritime boundaries established by
UNCLOS in the South China Sea.33 In 1988, China unlawfully occupied several
reefs in the Spratly Islands. It has since built harbors and military buildings there
and even added an airstrip and surface-to-air missile platforms.34 Several states—
including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—continue to dispute
Chinese claims to the Spratly Islands.35
Beyond territorial disputes, littoral states have expressed concerns about
Chinese sea lane restrictions, military maneuvers, and use of maritime militia. 36
Regional negotiations have established some baseline understandings and resulted
in a code of conduct declaration (2002), guidelines for the implementation of the
declaration (2011), a framework for the code of conduct (2017), and draft text
(2018).37 However, these efforts have not produced a binding agreement. This
may be partly due to Beijing’s backchannel economic statecraft and coercive
diplomacy, particularly its reliance on bilateral agreements to sidestep UNCLOS
compliance.38
Few states have directly challenged China under international law. The
Philippines, however, initiated an arbitration against China over noncompliance
with UNCLOS and other maritime conflicts. On July 12, 2016, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) announced a unanimous award in favor of the
Philippines. 39 In a nearly 500-page ruling, the PCA dismissed as invalid China’s

31

32
33
34

35
36

37

38
39

Id. at 442. See generally Marius Gjetnes, The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?, 32 OCEAN DEV. &
INT’L L. 191 (2001).
Koh, supra note 14, at 160.
See Julia Lisztwan, Stability of Maritime Boundary Agreements, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 153, 198 (2012).
Bill Hayton, Why China Built Its New Islands: From Abstract Claim to Concrete Assets, in GREAT POWERS,
GRAND STRATEGIES: THE NEW GAME IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 25, 34 (Anders Corr ed., 2018).
See Beckman, supra note 26, at 163.
See generally Keyuan Zou, China’s Approach to UNCLOS and the South China Sea, in LAW OF SEA 364
(Jill Barrett & Richard Barnes eds., 2016).
See Bill Hayton, After 25 Years, There’s Still No South China Sea Code of Conduct, FOREIGN POL’Y (July
21, 2021), https://perma.cc/T78C-W8F2.
See Corr, supra note 20, at 2.
South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Award, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2016).
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claims to historic rights by way of its nine-dash line.40 The ruling also found that
China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering with fishing and
resource exploration and aggravated other disputes through its dredging and
construction of artificial islands. Finally, the PCA clarified the characteristics of
“islands,” effectively eliminating China’s claim that its artificial islands generate
legal entitlements under UNCLOS. The court declared that features in the Spratly
Islands failed to generate a territorial claim for China.41 Still, the PCA
acknowledged that it does not have the authority to establish territorial sovereign
boundaries or maritime delimitation.42
Although the PCA award in the Philippines’ favor can be viewed as a victory
of international law, the ruling also shows the weakness of UNCLOS enforcement
against major powers. The PCA was able to move forward with China in absentia
by inviting comment on specific substantive and procedural issues and exercising
jurisdiction based on public statements, a position paper, and Chinese
communications with tribunal officials.43 In this way, the PCA established that a
state’s refusal to participate does not necessarily bar UNCLOS proceedings.44 But
China’s refusal to participate in the tribunal’s constitution or to submit pleadings
demonstrates how powerful nation-states can selectively engage with international
law. Even as it documented Chinese violations, the PCA award did little to
dissuade Beijing from continuing island construction or from expanding Chinese
military and maritime militia patrols. China continues to cite vague national
security laws to legitimate South China Sea actions that violate UNCLOS and
international law.

III. THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL DARK LAW
Authoritarian states often participate in international institutions and obey
international law to facilitate their interstate interests.45 But autocrats also brandish

40

41
42

43
44

45

See Lucy Reed & Kenneth Wong, Marine Entitlements in the South China Sea: The Arbitration Between the
Philippines and China, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 746, 747–48 (2016).
See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 39, at 41.
See Anne Sheehan, Dispute Settlement Under UNCLOS: The Exclusion of Maritime Delimitation Disputes,
24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 165, 183 (2005).
See Goldenziel, supra note 16, at 1114.
See UNCLOS, supra note 22, at 573:
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal
or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue
the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party
to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.
See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 187–92; Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2650 (1997).
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law to cloak illegality.46 Dark law describes the process by which legalistic autocrats
exploit statutory vagueness and a lack of judicial review to take actions that are, in
fact, counter to the rule of law.47 Dark law is a relational concept that describes
the convergence of national security lawmaking, judicial deference, and autocratic
politics. However, beyond masking autocratic illegality within a nation state, dark
law can shape international law and establish configurations of
legislative-judicial-political relations that aid the entrenchment of authoritarian
international law.
Dark law as an analytic category seeks to move beyond static conceptions of
national security law and toward recognition of national security lawmaking as a
series of dynamic relationships that unfold as part of transnational politics. In this
sense, dark law and authoritarian international law draw attention to authoritarian
logics and relationships that direct state power to enhance domestic social control
and promote global models of authoritarianism.
Autocratic leaders pragmatically cooperate with other states, in both
democracies and nondemocracies, to achieve common goals and produce public
goods unavailable through domestic channels.48 Authoritarian international law,
like other forms of international law, relies on relationships between diplomats
and other state officials to construct rules, principles, and norms. Through
interpersonal interactions and exchanges in domestic forums and international
organizations, authoritarian officials can create new kinds of relationships that
shift transnational normative understandings and expectations.49 From a relational
perspective, international law is the embodiment of interpersonal processes and
interactions and is experienced through the constraints and directionality these
social relations give to lawmaking and state action. Rather than view international
law as a fixed body of substantive agreements and rules, relational approaches see
it as historically contingent processes between state officials and other
transnational actors. Networks of relations constitute, sustain, and transform the
‘morality’ of international law. Durable international law relations transcend
specific social interactions to create enduring norms, political ideologies, state
commitments, and customary practice. But, at the same time, individual actions in
particular situations shape these evolving relational norms. Both immediate
decisions of state officials and broader entanglements and interdependencies
condition the development of international law. Authoritarian regimes can
46

47
48
49

See Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2018); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Autocracy Under Cover of the Transnational Legal Order, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 188, 190 (Gregory Shaffer, Tom Ginsburg & Terence C. Halliday
eds., 2019).
See Cody, supra note 3, at 658.
See Tom Ginsburg, Authoritarian International Law?, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 221, 226 (2020).
See Cassandra V. Emmons, International Organizations: Enablers or Impediments for Authoritarian
International Law?, 114 AM. J. INT’L 226, 228 (2020).
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promote common interests, like reasserting norms of noninterference or
redefining obligations under international law, and simultaneously develop new
terms to facilitate unlawful or illiberal activities.50 For example, authoritarian
leaders commonly repurpose human rights by placing emphasis on economic and
cultural rights in order to weaken enforcement for violations of civil and political
rights worldwide.51
Authoritarian regimes have other general traits as well. Autocrats rarely
relinquish sovereignty or submit to third-party adjudication in international
tribunals or arbitration courts.52 Also, because authoritarians focus primarily on
political survival, international law will tend to be viewed as a mechanism to
reinforce internal state control.53 However, even as authoritarians tactically and
sometimes reluctantly engage with international law, this engagement constructs
new layers of international law that can strengthen the stability of authoritarian
regimes and enhance illiberalism.54
Dark law and authoritarian international law offer complementary models of
undemocratic legal change that are layered, dynamic, and historically contingent.
They are also related concepts. Dark law enhances and entrenches authoritarian
international law. Legalistic autocrats not only repurpose vague security laws to
circumvent checks on their authority but also manage to reconstitute forms of
international law through that process. Dark law reconstructs transnational
relations and interactions in ways that reinforce authoritarian norms and
strengthen illiberal institutions. National security lawmaking in authoritarian
regimes often cultivates legal grey zones that transform the normative content of
international law more generally.55 If democratic backsliding continues and the
balance of power shifts to favor authoritarians, vague and overbroad security laws
and weak or non-existent judicial review will converge to empower autocrats
through dark law and authoritarian international law.56

50
51
52
53
54
55

56

See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 187.
See Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 225.
See id.
See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 191.
See CORR, supra note 20, at 9.
See generally Congyan Cai, Enforcing a New National Security?: China’s National Security Law and
International Law, 10 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 65 (2017).
See CORR, supra note 20, at 217.
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IV. OCEANIC IMPUNITY
China operates with virtual impunity on the South China Sea partly by
employing dark law to challenge weak forms of international law.57 Maritime
patrols authorized by law repeatedly target civilian fishing vessels and interfere
with resupplies of food and water to foreign sailors and marines in violation of
UNCLOS.58 Chinese vessels even ram foreign ships to deter rival coastal states
from exercising control over fishing grounds or strategic waterways.59 This all
occurs without serious economic or political consequences for China, which
continues to organize an expansive network of civilian fishing vessels to assist
with its strongarm diplomacy, particularly against Japan, Vietnam, and the
Philippines.60
These maritime civilian militia, sometimes called “the little blue men,”
receive substantial support and training from the Chinese government and
frequently coordinate their activities with the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN).61 Often equipped with advanced communications and radar systems, the
militia vessels enforce China’s unilateral fishing bans and provide logistical
support to forces occupying artificial island outposts.62 These irregular maritime
forces assist in the assertion of China’s sovereign control of disputed islands, reefs,
and seas while avoiding direct military-to-military confrontations.63 Generally,
military rules of engagement prohibit the U.S. Navy and other foreign warships
from pursuing counter-measures against these civilian vessels.64
Complicating the challenges of countering China’s maritime militia, many
militia vessels are not visible on traditional maritime tracking systems because of
a new law on data protection enacted in November 2021.65 The law, titled the
Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, prohibits

57

58
59

60

61
62
63

64
65

See Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Position on Maritime Claims
in the South China Sea (July 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/N4EX-MSB4; See generally, Douglas
Guilfoyle, The Rule of Law and Maritime Security: Understanding Lawfare in the South China Sea, 95 INT’L
AFFS. 999 (2019).
See CORR, supra note 20, at 109.
See Shashank Bengali & Vo Kieu Bao Uyen, Sunken Boats. Stolen Gear. Fishermen are Prey as China
Conquers a Strategic Sea, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/KS8Y-VH6G.
See James Kraska & Michael Monti, The Law of Naval Warfare and China's Maritime Militia, 91 INT'L
L. STUD. 450, 452 (2015).
Id. at 451–42.
See CORR, supra note 20, at 452.
See Elizabeth K. Kiessling, Gray Zone Tactics and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Can “One of the Vaguest
Branches of International Law” Solve the Gray Zone Problem?, 12 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 116, 127–29 (2021).
See Rob McLaughlin, An Incident in the South China Sea, 96 INT’L L. STUD. 505, 517 (2020).
See Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/H7MN-ETWR.
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the export of personal data collected in China to other countries.66 Domestic and
foreign organizations that process personal information are now subject to
heightened localization requirements that prevent the use of traditional tracking
systems, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which relies on
cross-national data transfers to track maritime vessels. This legal change
effectively cloaks the position of civilian militia ships.67 Framed by Beijing as a
data safeguard for China’s residents, the law also serves China’s broader efforts to
increase clandestine patrols and reinforce maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Oceans and seas have long been considered a common resource of all
humankind under international law.68 States generally enjoy expansive fishing
rights in open waters and freedom of navigation beyond coastal territories.69
However, China has sought to undermine these longstanding maritime principles.
In 2021, for example, China revised and enacted new laws that expand the scope
of its territorial jurisdiction and condone aggressive police and military tactics in
disputed waters. Below, I briefly discuss China’s Maritime Police Law and its
Maritime Traffic Safety Law as examples of dark law that facilitate China’s evasion
of international legal obligations under UNCLOS.

A. Maritime Police Law
In January 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s
Congress enacted a new Maritime Police Law (MPL) to regulate Chinese maritime
agencies, including China’s Coast Guard.70 The law covers a broad range of
maritime activities and interests, including efforts to stop offshore smuggling,
manage fisheries, develop natural resources, protect the environment, and
maintain maritime security. However, the law’s vague statutory language and vast
jurisdictional scope make it ripe for abuse.71
Statutory vagueness is problematic for two chief reasons: vague legal statutes
fail to provide sufficient public notice of legal standards, and they delegate
discretion to law enforcement agencies, which can result in arbitrary or

66

67

68
69
70

71

See Yiming “Ben” Hu, China’s Personal Information Protection Law and Its Global Impact, DIPLOMAT (Aug.
31, 2021), https://perma.cc/7RR5-7FQA.
Translation: Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China – Effective Nov. 1, 2021,
STAN.: DIGICHINA, (Sept. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/P3B8-7HAB.
See Koh, supra note 14, at 48.
See generally H.S. Kent, Historical Origins of the 3 Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT’L 537 (1954).
Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 84 (promulgated by Standing
Committee, 13th Nat’l People’s Cong., Jan. 22, 2021, effective Feb. 1, 2021) XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (Jan. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/276V-2XF7 [hereinafter MPL].
See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of China, 97 INT’L L. STUD. 465,
466 (2021).
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discriminatory enforcement.72 In the context of international maritime activities,
broad and unclear statutory language in recent maritime laws give extraordinary
discretion to China’s law enforcement agencies.
Many of the law’s vague terms— or absent definitions— seem intentional.
Article 3, for example, stipulates that enforcement agencies shall conduct
operations in waters under the jurisdiction of China, which presumably includes
disputed seas claimed by China within the nine-dash line.73 A sovereign state’s
maritime jurisdiction extends only twelve nautical miles under UNCLOS. The law
of the vessel’s flag state applies beyond these territorial seas. However, by using
vague statutory language not recognized under UNCLOS, such as “waters under
jurisdiction” or “jurisdictional seas,” China claims expansive jurisdiction to
disputed exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and waters near the continental shelf.
China’s use of unrecognized maritime boundaries violates the PCA ruling and
Article 74 of UNCLOS.74 It also creates legal grey zones in can be used to shift
rules and norms of international law.
Article 12 further tasks coastal police with guarding islands and reefs,
including artificial islands and disputed maritime features, to prevent any acts that
“endanger national sovereignty, security, and maritime rights and interests.”75
Article 17 authorizes coastal police to order foreign vessels to leave China’s
territorial seas and sanctions the detention, forced removal, and forced towing of
vessels that illegally remain in Chinese waters.76 Article 23 also sanctions the use
of administrative penalties, including restrictions of personal freedom, for
organizations and individuals who violate Chinese laws or regulations.77 Coastal
police can take advantage of the statutory language to justify the seizure of virtually
any vessel that navigates within the nine-dash line. The law goes even further
regarding foreign construction in the South China Sea. Article 20 tasks the Chinese
Coast Guard with blocking all unauthorized foreign construction and demolishing
unauthorized foreign facilities built within China’s jurisdiction.78 This language is
particularly concerning because nearly all state claimants maintain permanent
facilities within China’s claimed jurisdictional waters, including numerous
outposts in the Spratly, Paracel, and Pratas islands.79
The MPL also escalates use of force authorization against foreign
government vessels and warships. Article 1, for example, directs China’s Coast
72
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Guard and maritime police “to protect the sovereignty of the State, and to
safeguard the legitimate interests of the public, corporations, and other
organizations,” language which appears to endorse near limitless enforcement
activities in the South China Sea.80 Article 21 also sanctions any precautions or
control measures necessary to stop non-commercial foreign vessels, including
government ships and military warships, from illegally entering China’s
jurisdictional waters and further authorizes the forced eviction and towing of
foreign vessels that present a serious harm or threat.81 Article 22 further authorizes
all necessary measures, including military force, to stop illegal infringements or
imminent threats of illegal infringement on China’s sovereign territory, rights, or
jurisdiction.82 The meaning of illegal infringement under the law is unclear and
open to broad interpretation by Chinese authorities. But Article 22 potentially
authorizes military violence, including firing on or ramming vessels, in response
to foreign activities protected under freedom of navigation principles and
UNCLOS rules.
The law also expands authorization on the use of weapons and approves
more aggressive weaponry. Article 47 authorizes the use of small arms weapons if
there is evidence that a ship is carrying criminal suspects or illegally carrying
weapons, ammunition, state secrets, or drugs and refuses to obey an order to
stop.83 Coast Guard members are directed to “use weapons if there is no time for
warning or if there is a risk of serious harm after giving warning.” 84 Firing on
foreign ships is also authorized for illegal entry when captains refuse orders to
stop or to accept boarding or inspection.85 The MPL further authorizes the use of
military weapons during counterterrorism missions, when confronting serious
incidents of violence at sea, or when attacked by weapons or other dangerous
methods.86
Finally, the MPL threatens freedom of navigation principles by authorizing
coastal police to restrict or prohibit passage based on the establishment of
temporary maritime security zones.87 Under the law, the maritime police can
establish a security zone for various reasons, including to perform maritime
security tasks, combat illegality, deal with emergencies, guard marine resources,
protect the environment, or address “any other situation that requires the
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delimitation of temporary maritime security zones.”88 Under the law, which
imposes no temporal restrictions, these security zones could continue for days,
months, or even years.
Widespread vagueness in the MPL provides significant legal flexibility to
maritime agencies and, if abused, constitutes a form of dark law. The MPL permits
maritime police to act with wide discretion while simultaneously tasking the police
with an aggressive agenda that expands Chinese claims and ratchets up the
potential use of force. Additionally, the new law integrates the Coast Guard into
Chinese national defense forces by authorizing Coast Guard members to
participate in both military and police operations.89 This blurs the line between
domestic policing and military action. The MPL further gives broad discretion to
Chinese military officials to enforce maritime claims, by force if necessary.90 The
new law exemplifies China’s efforts to repurpose domestic security laws to
disregard international law.91

B. The Maritime Traffic Safety Law
In April 2021, China revised its 1983 Maritime Traffic Safety Law (MTSL)
in a manner that disregarded international legal obligations under UNCLOS. The
revised law is inconsistent with international law in its geographic scope and
endorses unlawful monitoring and interference with maritime vessels outside of
China’s territorial seas.
China’s expansive jurisdiction under the MTSL contravenes UNCLOS.
Article 2, for example, extends the reach of the revised law from “coastal waters”
to “sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China.” 92 This
statutory change intentionally replaces “coastal waters,” a well-recognized legal
term in maritime law, with a deliberately vague and indeterminate term, “seas
under the jurisdiction,” which lacks any validity under international law. As
revised, Beijing determines the law’s maritime jurisdiction, which presumably will
apply to all territories, features, and seabed areas enclosed by the nine-dash line,
in direct violation of the 2016 PCA arbitration ruling. These jurisdictional changes
also violate other established UNCLOS norms that require states with overlapping
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jurisdictional claims to refrain from any actions that might jeopardize a final
agreement or third-party settlement of the dispute.93
The MTSL also authorizes unlawful interference with foreign vessels in
violation of well-established freedom of navigation norms. Article 19, for
example, authorizes China’s Maritime Administrative Agency to restrict ship
routes and control maritime traffic outside of coastal waters.94 Under UNCLOS,
with limited exceptions, a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign maritime
vessels beyond its territorial sea.95 Ships navigating beyond national jurisdictions,
including the high seas and EEZs, generally are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag state where the vessel is registered. The flag state assumes
jurisdiction and bears responsibility to ensure maritime safety, vessel integrity, and
decent labor conditions. Yet, under the MTLS, China could assume jurisdiction
as a non-flag state.
Article 44 further authorizes restrictions on freedom of navigation, stating:
“A vessel shall not enter or pass through the restricted navigation zone in violation
of provisions.”96 While UNCLOS permits states to designate traffic and sea routes
for safety of navigation, it also requires coastal states to consider International
Maritime Organization recommendations before establishing restrictions.97
Coastal state laws are prohibited by UNCLOS from imposing any requirements
on foreign vessels that deny their right to innocent passage.98
Article 43 similarly constructs a legal grey zone that requires supplementary
compliance from vessels in valuable fisheries or heavily traveled ship routes.
Captains may be asked to improve lookouts, slow down, or abide by other Chinese
rules of navigation in these areas. While efforts at added safety appear reasonable,
these auxiliary rules provide a mechanism for China to exercise control over
vessels in contested and international waters. Vague standards and a lack of
meaningful judicial oversight empower Beijing to disregard established maritime
norms and principles.
Vagueness and overbreadth in these new laws, like other dark law relations,
create opportunities for Beijing to circumvent and redefine its international legal
obligations under UNCLOS. These revisions also make the laws applicable to
waters enclosed by the nine-dash line and legitimate Chinese aggression in
contested waters of the South China Sea. To the degree that these strategies prove
effective, we can expect to see greater reliance on vague national security laws and
corresponding shifts toward authoritarian international law.

97

See Pedrozo supra note 74, at 956, 958.
MTSL, supra note 92, art. 19.
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 44.
UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 22.

98

Id. art. 24.

93
94
95
96

Summer 2022

77

Chicago Journal of International Law

V. CONCLUSION
This Essay argues that authoritarian regimes leverage statutory vagueness in
domestic security laws to evade international legal obligations and, through this
process, contribute to the normative development of authoritarian international
law. I advance the concept of dark law as a relational framework for interpreting
conflict in the South China Sea and as a way to understand how national security
law can erode democratic norms and institutions, both in domestic and
international contexts. Legalistic autocrats wield ill-defined statutes in efforts to
entrench legal terms and ideas that will buttress authoritarianism in the
international system. Conflicts in the South China Sea reveal how Chinese
authorities have strategically repurposed domestic laws to undermine UNCLOS.
In recent decades, China has emerged as global power and a legalistic state. 99
President Xi and the Communist Party appear increasingly willing to employ law
to strengthen regime legitimacy. It is vital that the international law community
acknowledge and work to limit the development of authoritarian international law.
The question of how to limit authoritarian entrenchment in international
law, of course, demands context. Regarding conflicts in the South China Sea, I
offer a few modest suggestions. A binding code of conduct for coastal states
promises stability that could serve all claimant parties. Strengthening UNCLOS
enforcement offers another mechanism to encourage state compliance. Countries
and international institutions can do much more to promote multilateralism in
maritime governance. Continued failed governance and protection of the world’s
oceans and seas will have dire consequences for coastal communities and marine
ecosystems. Long overdue are a new generation of international agreements that
will protect biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions and establish a meaningful
system for oceanic accountability.
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